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Editorials
P ARTICULATE A IR P OLLUTION AND
M ORTALITY — C LEARING THE A IR

I

N the years after World War II, several episodes of
severe air pollution in the United States and Britain
aroused public concern about the effects on health
of air pollutants produced by burning fossil fuels. The
most dramatic, the London fog of December 1952,
caused thousands of deaths. Responding to concern
about air quality in the United States, Congress passed
the Clean Air Act in 1970. This act directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to identify pollutants that“may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and welfare” and to issue criteria for
air quality that, “allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health.” Thus authorized, the EPA set National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for particulate matter in 1971 and modified
the standards in 1987. The 1987 standard was based
on concentrations of particles with a mean aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to 10 µm, or PM10. The
maximal allowable 24-hour concentration was set at
150 µg per cubic meter, and the maximal allowable
annual mean was set at 50 µg per cubic meter.
In the United States, concentrations of particulate
air pollution have declined since the early 1970s. From
1988 to 1993, the average of the annual mean PM10
concentrations at 799 sites monitored by the EPA
declined by 20 percent.1 Despite these improvements
in air quality, a series of studies 2-4 reported associations
between particle concentrations and the numbers of
deaths per day in several U.S. cities with mean 24-hour
PM10 concentrations well below the standard. Responding to a substantial body of epidemiologic evidence, the EPA wrote in 1996 that the “staff can not
conclude that the current standards protect public
health with an adequate margin of safety” and that
“fine fraction particles [PM2.5, or particles with a diameter of less than 2.5 µm] are a better surrogate for
those particle components linked to mortality and
morbidity effects at levels below the current standards.”1 In 1997, the EPA retained the PM10 standards
and promulgated new 24-hour and annual standards
for PM2.5, of 65 and 15 µg per cubic meter, respectively, based on consistency with the literature on
health effects.
Both the epidemiologic evidence and the new PM2.5
standard have been criticized. Some observers have
asserted that the associations found in the epidemiologic studies are weak, inconsistent, and attributable
to confounding by weather, other pollutants, or misclassification of the exposure to particulate matter.5
They note that many of the studies were performed by
the same small group of investigators, that the study
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cities were not selected systematically, and that the
statistical models varied from study to study.
Arguing that the 1997 standards for ozone and particulate matter did not have an adequate scientific basis,
industry groups sued the EPA in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In 1999, the court
blocked implementation of the 1997 standards. In its
current session, the Supreme Court is hearing an appeal of this decision by the EPA.
A key issue before the Court is whether the cost of
compliance can be considered in setting the standard.
The EPA has estimated that compliance with the 1997
standards for PM2.5 and ozone will require an investment of about $10 billion per year to modify power
plants, diesel trucks, and other sources of these pollutants6 and will result in health benefits with an estimated value of $20 billion to $100 billion per year.
Others have estimated that the costs of compliance
could be as high as $60 billion per year.7 Thus, the
Supreme Court’s decision could have substantial consequences for the economy and the public’s health.
Given these stakes, the public and the scientific community need more and better information about the
health effects of particulate air pollution.
The study reported by Samet et al.8 in this issue
of the Journal (along with the more extensive investigation from which it is derived9) strengthens our understanding of the epidemiologic evidence and addresses the criticism of earlier work. The investigators
used a single analytic approach to examine the association between PM10 concentrations in a given 24hour period and the numbers of deaths reported on
the following day in 20 of the largest cities and metropolitan areas in the United States. Samet et al. found
an average increase in the rate of death from all causes
of about 0.5 percent for every increase in the PM10
concentration of 10 µg per cubic meter.
The PM10 concentrations were positively associated
with daily mortality rates in most of the 20 cities studied and at concentrations well below the current 24hour standard of 150 µg per cubic meter. In fact, the
90th percentile of the distribution of daily values was
below the 24-hour standard in each of the 20 cities.
Moreover, the association was specific to PM10. The
concentrations of other regulated air pollutants produced by the combustion of fossil fuels (sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen dioxide, and carbon monoxide) were weakly
and inconsistently associated with daily mortality rates.
Though ozone concentrations were positively associated with daily mortality rates during the summer
months, this relation did not influence the association
between the PM10 concentration and the daily mortality rate. Finally, the finding of a strong association
between the PM10 concentration and the rate of death
from cardiovascular and respiratory causes offers support for the idea that the concentrations of particulate air pollution influence mortality.
The findings of Samet et al. are consistent with
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those of time-series studies in Europe10 and cohort
studies in the United States.11 Thus, the evidence in
support of an association between the concentration
of particulate air pollution and the mortality rate is
consistent, is not affected by differences in statistical
methods, and can be generalized.
There are important gaps in both the scientific evidence of causation and the scientific basis for the regulatory response. The most important is our inability
to explain how fine particles affect health. Some studies have found that the daily mortality rate is associated with the concentration of fine particles (PM2.5)
but not coarse mass (PM10¡PM2.5).12 These findings
are consistent with the evidence that fine particles
penetrate indoor spaces, are chemically active, and are
deposited in the respiratory bronchioles and alveoli.
Yet little is known about the specific constituents or
characteristics of PM2.5 that adversely affect health.
Moreover, although the standard proposed in 1997
is based on concentrations of PM2.5, most of the epidemiologic evidence has been obtained from measurements of PM10 or other, less relevant indicators. Lacking knowledge of the harmful constituents of fine
particles and the mechanisms by which they affect
health, the EPA continues to propose standards based
on particle mass.
The epidemiologic evidence suggests that the association between fine-particle concentrations and mortality is linear across the entire range of current concentrations. Although substantial reductions can be
achieved at a reasonable cost, a reduction in 24-hour
exposures to levels consistently below the current
range would be prohibitively costly, if not impossible,
in the foreseeable future. An aggressive research program to identify the harmful components of PM2.5,
their sources, and the mechanisms of their effects offers the best hope for developing more focused regulatory strategies that will simultaneously protect the
public health and the nation’s prosperity. In the meantime, these results present a challenge to policy makers
who are required to protect the public’s health with
an adequate margin of safety.
JAMES H. WARE, PH.D.
Harvard School of Public Health
Boston, MA 02115
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W HEN AND H OW TO T REAT C HRONIC
L YMPHOCYTIC L EUKEMIA

C

HRONIC lymphocytic leukemia (CLL), the most
common form of leukemia in adults, is usually
recognized first by the patient’s primary care physician. When the patient has other medical problems
— which is frequently the case, given that the median
age at diagnosis is 64 years — the primary care physician collaborates with the hematologist or oncologist
in treating the patient. It is often difficult to make decisions about therapy, which can involve subtle factors
that are best understood by the patient’s own doctor.
CLL most commonly arises from a malignant clone
of B cells with a characteristic phenotype. It is far from
uniform in presentation and clinical course.1 Approximately one third of patients never require treatment
and die from causes unrelated to CLL; in another
third an initial indolent phase is followed by progression of the disease; and the remaining third have aggressive disease at the outset and need immediate
treatment.
The development of two different staging systems
by Rai et al.2 and Binet et al.3 has made possible the
division of patients with CLL into three prognostic
groups: those with good, intermediate, and poor prognoses (Table 1). The systems do not correspond well
with one another, however: Binet’s good-prognosis
group (stage A) includes twice as many patients as
Rai’s good-prognosis group (stage 0), whereas the
opposite is true in the case of patients with an intermediate prognosis (Binet stage B includes half as many
patients as Rai stages I and II). These differences can
affect the design of clinical trials.
Nevertheless, the two staging systems have improved physicians’ ability to identify patients who need
immediate treatment. Two long-term French trials4
and a meta-analysis of most of the randomized trials
conducted to date5 demonstrated that therapy with
chlorambucil — an oral alkylating agent and the
standard treatment for CLL — could be deferred for
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TABLE 1. THE RAI

SYSTEM

AND

STAGE

RISK

AND

BINET STAGING SYSTEMS

FOR

CHRONIC LYMPHOCYTIC LEUKEMIA.*
PERCENT OF MEDIAN
PATIENTS SURVIVAL RECOMMENDED TREATMENT

MANIFESTATIONS

years

Rai staging system
0
I
II
III
IV

Low
Intermediate
Intermediate
High
High

Lymphocytosis
Lymphadenopathy
Splenomegaly, lymphadenopathy, or both
Anemia, organomegaly, or both
One or more of the following: anemia,
thrombocytopenia, and organomegaly

Binet staging system
A
Low
Lymphocytosis, <3 lymphoid areas enlarged‡
B
Intermediate »3 Lymphoid areas enlarged‡
C
High
Anemia, thrombocytopenia, or both

31
35
26
6
2

>10
9
7
5
5

Watch and wait
Treat only with progression†
Treat only with progression†
Treatment indicated in most cases
Treatment indicated in most cases

63§
30
7

>10
7
5

Watch and wait
Treatment indicated in most cases
Treatment indicated in most cases

*Lymphocytosis is present in all stages of the disease.
†Progression is defined by weight loss, fatigue, fever, massive organomegaly, and a rapidly increasing lymphocyte count.
‡Enlarged lymphoid areas may include the cervical, axillary, and inguinal lymph nodes; the spleen or liver may also be enlarged.
§Stage A includes all patients with Rai stage 0 disease, two thirds of patients with Rai stage I disease, and one third of those with Rai stage II
disease.

patients with Binet stage A disease. This low-risk
group, which comprises almost two thirds of patients
with CLL, has a median age at diagnosis of 64 years
and an expected survival of more than 10 years, which
is close to the life expectancy of a normal population
matched for sex and age.4,5 Moreover, deferring therapy until progression of the disease makes it necessary
does not compromise survival.4,5 More than 25 percent of patients with indolent disease (stage A or
stage 0), however, die of causes related to CLL; in 40
percent the disease progresses to advanced stages; and
50 percent ultimately require treatment.4
Neither the Rai nor the Binet staging system enables physicians to predict which patients in the goodprognosis group will eventually have progressive disease. Serum levels of beta2-microglobulin, lactate
dehydrogenase, and soluble CD23 (a B-cell membrane protein) can help predict disease activity, but
the presence in the leukemic B cells of cytogenetic abnormalities such as deletions in chromosome 11q6 or
somatic mutations in the immunoglobulin heavychain genes7,8 are better predictors of rapid progression
and survival. These recent findings suggest that there
are two types of CLL: one arises from relatively less
differentiated (immunologically naive) B cells with unmutated heavy-chain genes and has a poor prognosis; the other evolves from more differentiated B cells
(memory B cells) with somatically mutated heavychain genes and has a good prognosis.7,8 It is unclear
whether patients with Binet stage A CLL or Rai’s indolent forms whose leukemic B cells have either of
these types of abnormalities would benefit from early
treatment; this possibility should be tested in a prospective clinical trial. By contrast, there is consensus
1800 ·

that most patients with Binet stage B or C disease or
Rai stage III or IV disease, as well as patients with Rai
stage I or II disease that is progressive, and who have
a life expectancy of seven years or less, should be considered for early treatment.9
But what treatment should they receive? Chlorambucil is the best-tolerated and least expensive drug.
Fludarabine, a purine analogue, yields better rates of
response but causes more myelosuppression and greater reductions in CD4 lymphocytes than chlorambucil and costs more than combination chemotherapy.
Alopecia, vomiting, diarrhea, and cardiac toxicity are
side effects of combination chemotherapy, which, like
fludarabine, requires intravenous administration. None
of these treatments can cure CLL.
In this issue of the Journal, Rai et al.10 report the
results of a long-term, multicenter, randomized trial
comparing fludarabine with chlorambucil in 509 previously untreated patients with advanced CLL. Although the dose of chlorambucil was somewhat lower than usual, the patients in this important trial had
higher rates of response and longer periods of remission and progression-free survival with fludarabine
than with chlorambucil. Nevertheless, neither fludarabine nor chlorambucil prolonged overall survival.
These results raise questions about the role of fludarabine in the management of CLL and about the
directions treatment and decisions about treatment
should take in the future. To put the report by Rai
et al. in context, we should consider other investigations of the treatment of patients with CLL. A randomized trial by the French Cooperative Group on
Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia enrolled 938 previously untreated patients with Binet stage B or C dis-
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ease.11 Fludarabine was compared with two drug combinations: cyclophosphamide, doxorubicin, and prednisone (CAP), and a modified version of cyclophosphamide, doxorubicin, vincristine, and prednisone
(mini-CHOP). The rates of response and progressionfree survival were roughly similar for mini-CHOP (a
double dose of cyclophosphamide and half the dose
of doxorubicin) and fludarabine, and the rates were
better with both of these regimens than with CAP.
Similar results were obtained in a European trial that
compared fludarabine with CAP.12
A meta-analysis of 10 randomized trials involving
2035 patients with advanced CLL compared chlorambucil with several regimens of combination chemotherapy5; in none of these trials did an improvement
in the rate of response translate into improved survival.
The lack of improvement in survival despite superior
rates of response has been observed with other chronic lymphoid cancers and could be due to problems
with subsequent treatment or the failure of the treatment to eliminate all malignant cells.
Current studies are evaluating treatments called
intensification procedures, which aim for a complete
molecular remission (defined as no evidence of molecular markers of the malignant clone after treatment).
Such treatments include the administration of purine
analogues with or without other drugs, followed by
autologous bone marrow transplantation or the administration of monoclonal antibodies (e.g., antiCD52 or anti-CD20) or both.13 Some patients have
had a sustained molecular remission with such intensive treatments, but it is unknown whether the treatment cures the disease or just delays a relapse. Conventional allogeneic bone marrow transplantation can
probably be curative in some cases, but only 10 percent of patients with CLL are eligible for this treatment, which is associated with a mortality rate of more
than 40 percent. Allogeneic bone marrow transplantation in which the patient’s marrow is not ablated by
high-dose chemotherapy is another option now being
evaluated.
Randomized trials of these strategies are time-consuming and expensive, but they are essential. Meanwhile, what should physicians do for patients with
CLL? Our recommendations are summarized in Table 1. Patients with Binet stage A (or Rai stage 0)
disease require only observation. In our opinion, relatively young patients (perhaps those less than 65 years
old) with advanced CLL, for whom a cure is theoretically possible, should participate in a randomized
trial of one of the aggressive new strategies. For older
patients or those with substantial coexisting conditions, the aim should be palliation. For this purpose,
we prefer chlorambucil. For patients who do not fit
in either category, decisions about therapy may vary.

Some physicians prefer to start with chlorambucil and
switch to mini-CHOP or purine analogues if there is
no response, whereas other physicians immediately
initiate treatment with fludarabine. Fludarabine is the
best option for disease that is refractory to alkylating
agents,14 and we recommend mini-CHOP for disease
that is refractory to fludarabine.11 There is evidence
that patients with a poor prognosis may benefit from
intensification strategies if their general health permits. We believe that, depending on the patient’s age
and coexisting diseases, intensification procedures are
justified in such patients.
GUILLAUME DIGHIERO, M.D., PH.D.
Institut Pasteur
F-75724 Paris, France

JACQUES-LOUIS BINET, M.D.
Hôpital Pitié-Salpêtrière
75651 Paris, France
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Sounding Board

arette smokers were more dependent on their habit
than were the users of other tobacco products.”5
THE FDA AND TOBACCO

T OBACCO , THE F OOD AND D RUG
A DMINISTRATION , AND C ONGRESS

S

MOKING has been the number-one target of
public health professionals in the United States for
more than a decade because it is the leading cause of
premature death. Nonetheless, no unified public health
strategy has been developed. In 1995, with the strong
endorsement of President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore, the commissioner of the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), Dr. David Kessler, announced that the agency had jurisdiction over tobacco
and would regulate cigarettes as “drug-delivery devices.”1 The tobacco companies objected and sued the
FDA, arguing that Congress had not given the FDA
jurisdiction over their product. The Supreme Court,
in a five-to-four opinion issued in March 2000, agreed
with the tobacco companies.2 Although many public
health experts were outraged by the result, the most
remarkable thing about the case from our perspective
was not the result, but the fact that four justices dissented. In this article, we outline the historical background of the opinion, explain why we feel it was not
surprising, and offer a proposal for congressional action to reduce the harm caused by tobacco.
TOBACCO REGULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES

More than 100 years ago, the Tennessee Supreme
Court upheld the conviction of a person for selling
cigarettes, saying that cigarettes were “wholly noxious
and deleterious to health. Their use is always harmful, never beneficial. They possess no virtue, but are
inherently bad, and bad only. They find no true commendation for merit or usefulness in any sphere.”3
At the turn of the 20th century, 14 states outlawed
the sale, the manufacture, or the possession of cigarettes; 21 other states had considered such a ban; and
2 states had passed laws that declared cigarettes to be
narcotics.4,5
Henry Ford and Thomas Edison condemned cigarettes and their users in a book entitled The Case
against the Little White Slaver. In the book, Edison
wrote that cigarettes produce “degeneration of the
cells of the brain, which is quite rapid among boys.
Unlike most narcotics this degeneration is permanent
and uncontrollable. I employ no person who smokes
cigarettes.”6 As Cassandra Tate explains in her recent
history of cigarette smoking and reform movements
in America, “Early reformers described nicotine as
both poisonous and enslaving. Although they did not
understand the precise mechanisms of cigarette addiction . . . simple observation suggested that cig1802 ·

Until 1995, every FDA commissioner and FDA general counsel who took a position on this subject concluded that the FDA had no authority to regulate
tobacco. This is not as surprising as it might seem.
The FDA does not have broad general powers to protect public health; it has the authority only to regulate
specific classes of products. The FDA has authority to
regulate drugs, for example, which are defined by the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as “articles (other than
food) that are intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body.”7 This definition was adopted
by Congress in 1938 to give the FDA authority over
products that are marketed as capable of curing diseases or enhancing well-being.
In 1977, a tobacco-control organization, Action on
Smoking and Health, petitioned the FDA to regulate
cigarettes containing nicotine as a “drug” or “device”
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.7 Action
on Smoking and Health asked the FDA to regulate
cigarettes no less strictly than it does saccharin and to
restrict the sale of cigarettes to pharmacies. The FDA
denied the petition, and Action on Smoking and
Health sued the FDA. The FDA argued that it could
not deem cigarettes a drug unless manufacturers made
health claims; such claims would show that the product was “intended” to affect the structure or function
of the body and would qualify it as a drug under the
provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.8 The
fact that an article is dangerous or even deadly is not
sufficient to give the FDA jurisdiction over it.
In 1980, the U.S. Court of Appeals in the District
of Columbia found that a literal reading of the statute would give the FDA jurisdiction over “anything
which stimulates the senses.” The court nonetheless
upheld the FDA’s position that it had no authority to
regulate cigarettes, because it found that Congress did
not intend the FDA to have such broad power.8 The
court cited testimony of a member of the office of the
general counsel of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in which he stated that chemical
sprays such as Mace are not drugs according to the definition in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, although
they affect the structure and function of the body.8
In 1996, the FDA tried to justify its new position
on the basis that it had discovered new evidence.
“This evidence includes the emergence of a scientific
consensus that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco cause
addiction to nicotine and the disclosure of thousands
of pages of internal tobacco company documents detailing that these products are intended by manufacturers to affect the structure and function of the human body.”9 But the long history of the known effects
of cigarettes on the body, and the implausibility that
the FDA was unaware of the industry’s goal of selling
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cigarettes to habitual smokers, make this position unpersuasive. It is simply not convincing to argue that
the FDA was ignorant of the fact that cigarette makers controlled the amount of nicotine in cigarettes.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Federal Trade
Commission was well aware of the industry’s control
over the amount of tar and nicotine contained in different brands of cigarettes.10 Moreover, in 1981 the
Surgeon General issued a report entitled The Changing Cigarette, which evaluated the pharmacologic and
health effects resulting from the industry’s lowering
of the amounts of tar and nicotine in cigarettes over
the years.11

tic” reading of the statute led to the conclusion that
cigarettes were not meant to be included as a drug under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The court
noted, for example, that the reason the FDA chose to
regulate cigarettes as a device rather than as a drug was
that if cigarettes were drugs, the FDA would have to
ban them; the FDA has more leeway with devices. The
court concluded: “This transparent action by the FDA,
obvious sophistry, taken in order to avoid the new
drug provisions of the Act, reinforces the conclusion
that regulation of tobacco products under the Act
was not intended by Congress.”13

THE FDA’S TOBACCO REGULATIONS

The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, affirmed the ruling of the appeals court that the FDA does not have
jurisdiction over tobacco. The court stated, “Viewing the FDCA [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] as a
whole, it is evident that one of the Act’s core objectives
is to ensure that any product regulated by the FDA
is ‘safe’ and ‘effective’ for its intended use. . . . The
Act generally requires the FDA to prevent the marketing of any drug or device where the ‘potential for
inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by the
possibility of therapeutic benefit.’”2 The Court then
noted that the FDA has exhaustively demonstrated
that tobacco products are dangerous, and it found that
the logical consequence would be a mandatory ban
on cigarettes if the FDA actually had jurisdiction. The
Court found that a ban on tobacco products by the
FDA would plainly contradict congressional policy,
which has consistently been to take measures less severe than a ban in regard to tobacco regulation, as
evidenced by the passage of six statutes relating to
tobacco since 1965.2
The Court described as “ironic” the FDA’s position that cigarettes were “safe” when the agency also
acknowledges that cigarettes kill 400,000 people annually. “The inescapable conclusion,” the court stated,
“is that there is no room for tobacco products within
the FDCA’s regulatory scheme. If they cannot be used
safely for any therapeutic purpose, and yet they cannot be banned, they simply do not fit.”2 Congress is
well aware of the dangers of smoking and has chosen
not to ban cigarettes. The Court found that before
an agency would be deemed to have the power to
“regulate an industry constituting a significant part
of the American economy,” it would need much more
explicit indications of that authority from Congress
than congressional inaction in the face of the FDA’s
denials, for over 80 years, that it had jurisdiction over
tobacco products.2
The dissent, written by Justice Stephen Breyer, argued that the words of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act could be construed to include nicotine within
the meaning of the term “drug,” that Congress has
never explicitly said that the FDA did not have juris-

The 1996 FDA regulations focused on trying to
reduce smoking by children. They prohibited the sale
of cigarettes to anyone under 18 years of age, required
photo identification as a condition of the sale of cigarettes to all persons under the age of 27 years, prohibited the sale of packs of fewer than 20 cigarettes,
prohibited free samples and sales from vending machines, except in certain “adult locations,” and restricted certain forms and locations of advertising and promotion.1,9 In practice, most of the regulations were
not particularly burdensome to the industry. Many
states and localities had imposed similar restrictions
on advertising and sales, and the industry eventually
agreed to most of them as part of a class-action settlement reached in November 1998 with the attorneys
general of 46 states. (The text of the agreement may
be viewed on the Internet at http://www.naag.org/
tobac/index.html.)
The tobacco industry went to court to have the
regulations nullified. It argued that if the FDA had
jurisdiction over tobacco as a drug, it would also have
the authority (and probably the obligation) to take cigarettes off the market, as it has done with other unsafe
drugs. Future regulations, or even a ban, would be at
the discretion of the FDA.
THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS

In 1997, FDA jurisdiction over tobacco was considered by the U.S. District Court of North Carolina.12
The industry picked North Carolina as its forum for
challenging the FDA’s authority in the hope of finding a friendly ear. However, Judge William Osteen
ruled for the FDA, finding that the FDA had acted
appropriately under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act when it classified nicotine as a drug and cigarettes
as nicotine-delivery devices. The judge upheld the
FDA’s authority to restrict tobacco sales, but not its
authority to regulate the advertising or promotion
of cigarettes.12
The following year the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reversed this ruling in a two-to-one
decision.13 In essence, the court found that a “holis-
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diction, and that the FDA could change its position
in the light of “new evidence” that the cigarette companies intended smokers to obtain nicotine from cigarettes. Breyer also disagreed that the FDA would be
required to ban cigarettes if it had jurisdiction, but
he did admit that it was possible that his interpretation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act “gets the
words right [but] lacks a sense of their ‘music.’”2
Breyer is literally correct that the definition of the
term “drug” as it is used in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act can be contorted to encompass tobacco. But
this approach ignores the larger issue of congressional
intent; it is unlikely that members of Congress who
voted to give the FDA authority to regulate drugs and
devices thought that cigarettes would fall into these
categories. Arguing against the notion that a ban
would be required, for example, Breyer gave as a
counterexample the continued marketing of chemotherapeutic agents to treat cancer that have dangerous
side effects. But what he missed is that these drugs
offer therapeutic benefits and are marketed as such.
There is no analogy between weighing the risks and
benefits of agents that are created and marketed for
the purpose of alleviating suffering or prolonging lives
(the function that Congress had intended for the FDA
in creating the agency) and evaluating cigarettes. Unlike chemotherapeutic agents, cigarettes offer risks
without therapeutic benefits.
LAW, POLICY, AND THE FDA

It should be emphasized that the Supreme Court’s
ruling was not about whether the FDA should have
jurisdiction over tobacco products, but about whether Congress had, in fact, given the FDA such jurisdiction. The FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction was the result
not of a public-policy debate, but of a decision by a
commissioner who saw a public health void that he
felt needed to be filled. Were there to be such a debate,
we believe it would become clear that the FDA is a
poor candidate for the job of regulating tobacco, because, to paraphrase Justice Breyer, of the music it
plays. The overriding regulatory charter of the FDA
is the determination of the safety and efficacy of the
drugs and devices over which it has jurisdiction. But
the standards of safety and efficacy simply cannot be
applied to cigarettes. If Congress were to create an
agency to regulate cigarettes, or if tobacco-control advocates were to draft a statute enabling the creation
of such an agency, the words “safety” and “efficacy”
would not, and could not, be found in its charter. An
examination of the FDA’s argument for regulating tobacco products, which was greeted with such skepticism by the Supreme Court, demonstrates the inappropriateness of the current law for this purpose.
It is both disturbing and surprising that the FDA
would argue, as it did, that it should keep cigarettes
on the market because they are “safe and effective” for
addicted adults.9 In the case of children, the FDA’s
1804 ·

argument is that the “serious health consequences of
using tobacco products support an approach designed
to reduce their use.”9 The FDA went on to say that
“many children who use tobacco products are in a period of initiation and are not addicted” and that therefore the prohibition of the sale of such products to
minors will effectively reduce their use of tobacco
products. Elsewhere in the comments on its regulations, however, the FDA said that 75 percent of young
users of smokeless tobacco are addicted to nicotine.9
In regard to adults, the FDA made no attempt to
reduce smoking or the harmful or addictive effects of
cigarettes. Instead, it said that there are 50 million
smokers and that 77 to 92 percent of them are addicted to nicotine.9 It then said that the sudden withdrawal from the market of products to which millions of
people are addicted would be “dangerous” and could
cause “significant health risks,”9 although it did not
specify what those risks are. “Dangerous” is a surprising and unconvincing way for a public health agency
to describe the cessation of smoking. But at the same
time as the FDA supported the use of cigarettes as
a treatment for addicted smokers, it made no effort to
limit the sale of cigarettes to addicts only, or to restrict
sales to pharmacies. One would expect the FDA to
limit the sale of a drug that it claims is addictive but
is necessary for treatment.
The FDA also claimed, without providing evidence,
that if cigarettes were banned the health care system
could be “overwhelmed” by people seeking assistance
for withdrawal symptoms.9 The health care system,
however, is not now full of recovering nicotine addicts.
Indeed, if it is nicotine withdrawal that concerns the
FDA, it should at least have suggested that there are
other sources of nicotine available to smokers, and that
such sources might be made more widely available in
the event that cigarettes were banned. The FDA also
claimed to be concerned about the creation of a black
market for cigarettes, which it said could lead to the
use of cigarettes containing even more dangerous substances than those found in the cigarettes currently
available.9 It used an analogy with illegal distilleries
that make unsafe alcoholic beverages. This analogy is
far-fetched, since people are unlikely to grow their
own tobacco in large quantities. Any black market
would likely take the form of smuggled cigarettes.
The FDA then concluded:
On balance, an approach that prohibits the sale and promotion of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to children and adolescents, while permitting the sale to adults seems most
appropriate. . . . It is consistent with the statutory standard of reasonable assurance of safety and is more effective in
achieving public health goals than a ban on all tobacco
products. . . . These products are “effective” for adults who
are addicted to tobacco products because such products sustain with great efficacy the individual’s continued need for
the active ingredient nicotine. Tobacco products are effective for preventing withdrawal symptoms in individuals ad-
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dicted to nicotine in much the same way that methadone
is effective in preventing withdrawal.9

Thus, the FDA concluded, after finding that cigarettes kill more than 400,000 people a year, that it
is more “dangerous” to take cigarettes off the market
than to keep them available. But if cigarettes are safe
and effective for treating addicted adults, why are addicted 17-year-olds denied this safe and effective drug?
Moreover, children who have only smoked for a short
time are far less likely to suffer the physical consequences of tobacco use than adults. Children do not
get emphysema and lung cancer from cigarettes; it
takes many years of tobacco use for these diseases to
develop. So in some bizarre way, cigarettes themselves
might be “safer” for addicted children to use than for
addicted adults. Because children cannot legally get
tobacco items under these rules, they must resort to
their own version of the black market that the FDA
finds so troubling in the case of adults. Finally, the
analogy with methadone treatment is inapt. The FDA’s
argument suggests that heroin addicts should be provided with heroin, since what is being advocated here
is giving nicotine addicts nicotine.
In our view, it is not surprising that the Supreme
Court rejected the FDA’s position. But the FDA made
these tenuous arguments for good reason. The agency needed to create a justification to fit tobacco into a
statutory scheme that was never used or intended to
be used to control tobacco products. The point is
neither that children should have access to cigarettes
nor that cigarettes should be banned for adult consumption. The point is that, as currently authorized
by Congress, the FDA is the wrong agency with the
wrong standards for the regulation of tobacco products. Congress could give the FDA jurisdiction over
cigarettes, but Congress would also need to provide
a standard other than safety and effectiveness for the
agency to use in its regulation.
WHO SHOULD REGULATE TOBACCO
PRODUCTS?

The decision of the Supreme Court provides an
opportunity for a wide-ranging debate on what type
of agency Congress should create to regulate the tobacco industry. There are at least two agencies that
might qualify as models, including the Federal Trade
Commission, which regulates deceptive advertising,
and the Consumer Product Safety Commission, which
creates safety standards for a wide range of consumer
products.14
A scheme for the appropriate regulation of tobacco
products would be enormously complex. However,
the harm caused by tobacco use is so serious that we
believe it warrants the creation of a new federal agency. It could be called the Tobacco Control Agency and
could be authorized to regulate tobacco products exclusively. We think that for such an agency to be effective, four guidelines must be agreed to.

First, the goal of the new agency must be to reduce
smoking. The goal of eliminating smoking is unrealistic. Prohibition, either through outright legislation
or through massive behavioral change, will not occur
and will not work anytime in the foreseeable future.
This view is not fatalistic but realistic. A reduction in
smoking, however, can be achieved by reducing the
number of people who start smoking and increasing
the number of people who stop.
Second, the new agency should develop and fund
research to determine effective incentives for reducing
the initiation of smoking or increasing the cessation
of smoking and provide financial support for methods found to be effective. We do not know the best
approach and must not pretend that bans on advertising and promotion or similar interventions are effective. With the exception of black teenagers, a group
in which there has been a substantial reduction in
smoking, smoking among adolescents remained steady
or increased slightly in the 1990s, even in the face of
increasingly ubiquitous and strident antismoking campaigns.15-17 Without an understanding of why some
approaches are effective and others are not, antismoking campaigns will more closely resemble the efforts
of the temperance movement than they will effective
and scientifically based public health campaigns.
Third, the new agency must oversee the development of a “safer cigarette.” The slogan “there is no
such thing as a safe cigarette” must be replaced by the
recognition that safer cigarettes are possible. The agency’s goal should be a reduction of harm of the sort that
has such an important role in other public health endeavors, particularly those involving individual behavior. There is no such thing as a safe car, but this does
not prevent us from accepting that some people will
die in car accidents and, at the same time, trying to
make safer cars.
Finally, the new agency must test cigarettes for compliance with its specifications and require the disclosure
of ingredients in cigarettes that might affect purchasing decisions. The agency should create standards for
companies to follow in an effort to create safer cigarettes. Once the agency sets the standards, it should
not leave it to the industry to conduct testing. This
proactive standard setting and testing would differ
from current FDA practice, which largely reacts to
the creation of new products by the drug and device
industries and their submission of data for marketing approval.
Although many of these activities are currently pursued by a variety of federal agencies, making one federal agency responsible for research and policy on the
control of tobacco use would be the most effective way
to regulate the industry and coordinate national tobacco-control efforts. The states will receive large amounts
of money from their settlement with the tobacco companies, but different states will use that money for different purposes. There is no requirement that any of
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the $248 billion from the tobacco settlement be used
for tobacco-control efforts. Tobacco use is a national
public health issue and is bound up in interstate commerce. It is not restricted to any one state. Creating
a federal agency with broad power that can be active,
can regulate the manufacture of tobacco products, and
can create, fund, and assess large-scale programs for
the reduction of smoking is an appropriate use of federal power.
LEONARD H. GLANTZ, J.D.
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
Boston University School of Public Health
Boston, MA 02118

REFERENCES
1. Annas GJ. Cowboys, camels, and the First Amendment: the FDA’s restrictions on tobacco advertising. N Engl J Med 1996;335:1779-83.
2. Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000).
3. Austin v. State, 101 Tenn 563 (1898).
4. Tate C. In the 1800s anti-smoking was a burning issue. Smithsonian
1989;20:107-17.
5. Idem. Cigarette wars, the triumph of the little white slaver. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999.
6. Ford H. The case against the little white slaver: volumes I, II and III.
Detroit: Henry Ford, 1914-5.
7. 21 USC 321 (g)(1)(C).
8. Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236 (DC Cir.
1980).
9. Food and Drug Administration. Regulations restricting the sale and distribution of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to protect children and adolescents. Fed Regist 1996;61(168):44396, 44629.
10. 29 FR 530-532 (1964).
11. Department of Health and Human Services. The health consequences
of smoking: the changing cigarette: a report of the Surgeon General. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981.
12. Coyne Beahm v. FDA, 966 F.Supp. 1374 (1997).
13. Brown and Williamson v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4 Cir. 1998).
14. Kluger R. Ashes to ashes: America’s hundred-year cigarette war, the
public health, and the unabashed triumph of Philip Morris. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996.
15. Achievements in public health, 1900–1999: Tobacco use — United
States, 1900–1999. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1999;48:986-93.
16. Tobacco use among middle and high school students — United States,
1999. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2000;49:49-53.
17. Tobacco use among high school students — United States, 1997.
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1998;47:229-33.
©2000, Massachusetts Medical Society.

P ROTECTING THE P UBLIC H EALTH
BY S TRENGTHENING THE F OOD AND
D RUG A DMINISTRATION ’ S A UTHORITY
OVER T OBACCO P RODUCTS

F

OR years, public health experts hypothesized that
cigarettes that had less tar would also be less hazardous. However, recent studies have actually shown
an increase in the relative risk of all major smokingrelated diseases among smokers, even though most
cigarettes now contain far less tar than those that were
on the market 40 years ago.1 One reason may be that
the tobacco companies designed these newer cigarettes
1806 ·

to reduce the tar levels that are measured by the machine-generated tests sanctioned by the government
without affecting the actual intake of tar by smokers
and without regard to the level of specific harmful
substances such as nitrosamine. Another reason may
be related to the additives the tobacco companies use
to enhance the taste of the cigarettes with lower levels
of tar. Yet another may be related to the practices used
by the tobacco industry to maintain the powerful pharmacologic effects of the nicotine in cigarettes even as
they are promoted as “lighter.”
For years, physicians and public health officials have
struggled to help people quit smoking and to decrease
the number of children who start and who progress
from experimental smoking to heavy dependence. Yet
even with the recent progress in products and techniques designed to help people quit, the success rate
is far from satisfactory. Although the powerful effect
of nicotine is well understood, until recently little was
known about how, why, and how much the tobacco
industry secretly manipulated nicotine levels in its
products and controlled the nicotine yield to consumers. Even today, public health experts doubt that the
whole truth is known.
The marketing of tobacco has a powerful effect on
both the decision to start smoking and decisions to
continue, to switch to “lower tar” products, or to quit
altogether. More than 35 years ago, the tobacco companies promised not to market their products to children.2-4 They have reaffirmed that promise with frightening regularity ever since. Yet in 2000, the rate of
smoking is at a near-record high among teens, and
millions of Americans continue to smoke low-tar tobacco products.5 Tobacco marketing continues to be
virtually unregulated. The images that have the most
powerful effect on children are carefully placed in locations where children will see and absorb them. As
long ago as the 1950s, concern was expressed about
the potential for tobacco manufacturers to use tar and
nicotine claims to mislead consumers about the relative safety of their products.6 Still, advertising for lowtar products has also largely escaped meaningful governmental oversight. As a result, millions of people in
the United States have switched to lower-tar or “light”
products in the false belief that these products substantially reduce their risk of disease.7
Why has so little progress been made in these areas,
and why are there so many open questions? The public health community continues to fight the tobacco
epidemic with one hand tied behind its back. If a
company like Philip Morris changes the ingredients
in the macaroni and cheese that its food division
makes, it has to change the label to provide consumers with this information. If it adds an ingredient to
this product that has not previously been tested and
approved for use in a food, it must submit detailed
data on safety to the government. The government
must then approve the addition of the ingredient be-
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fore the company may put the product on the market.
If, however, Philip Morris adds a chemical to one of its
tobacco products, it need tell no one and need submit no safety data.
Although tobacco causes more than 400,000 deaths
each year in the United States, including one of every
three deaths due to cancer, tobacco products and the
tobacco industry have escaped even the most common-sense public health regulation. Manufacturers
do not have to disclose the ingredients in each brand
of cigarettes, nor do they have to tell anyone when
they change the blend of tobacco, add new ingredients, or add ammonia to liberate nicotine in order to
increase its effect. Furthermore, redesigned products
and new ingredients do not have to be tested to determine the effects of the changes on the health of
people who smoke.
The gap in responsibility extends beyond the lack
of requirements for tobacco companies to report to
the government and the public. If a manufacturer of
any other product possesses the knowledge or ability
to make its product safer, it is required to do so. If
a product poses a health hazard, the manufacturer is
required to take all reasonable steps to research and
implement a solution — but not the tobacco industry. What is the effect of the failure to require the tobacco industry to exercise the same responsibility for
taking all reasonable steps to reduce the harm caused
by its products? The industry’s own documents indicate that the companies agreed not to compete with
each other on the basis of the relative safety of their
products because it would be bad for the industry’s
bottom line.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has tried
to fill the regulatory void. In the 1990s, it undertook
the most extensive investigation of the tobacco industry ever conducted by any governmental agency. On
August 23, 1996, the FDA announced its conclusion
— that it had the authority to regulate tobacco products as drugs and drug-delivery devices. Under the
federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,8 enacted in
1938, the FDA would have the authority to regulate
tobacco products if they were properly classified as
“articles (except for food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.” There already existed a solid body of evidence that the nicotine in tobacco
products is addictive.9 The key, therefore, was evidence
about the intent of the tobacco manufacturers.
The FDA probe — according to David Kessler, the
former commissioner of the agency, and colleagues —
was “part scientific inquiry and part detective work.”10
The evidence came from multiple sources, but it all
pointed to the same conclusion. For years the tobacco
manufacturers knew about the addictive effect of the
nicotine in their products and consciously manipulated the delivery of nicotine in a highly sophisticated
manner. The manufacturers provided smokers with
carefully controlled, pharmacologically active doses

of nicotine, in sufficient quantities to “keep consumers addicted to those products.”10
Much of the evidence cited by the FDA had never
before been available outside the tobacco industry.
The evidence included previously secret documents
from the industry, such as those from Brown and Williamson, dating from as far back as the 1960s, in which
industry officials had concluded that “smoking is a
habit of addiction.”11 Another document, authored by
Addison Yeaman, averred, “we are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug.”12 The evidence also included the testimony of former industry
scientists who had conducted extensive tests for one
company that demonstrated that nicotine possessed
the properties of an addictive substance.13
Internal industry evidence showed that the companies carefully chose not only which tobaccos but which
parts of the tobacco leaf they used on the basis of
their nicotine content. A confidential internal company handbook revealed that companies used chemical
additives such as ammonia to increase the effect of nicotine on consumers.14 This evidence and the mountains of additional evidence acquired by the FDA
changed the public perception of the tobacco product. Tobacco products could no longer be considered
simple agricultural products. They were instead highly technical devices used to administer doses of the
drug nicotine. In other words, tobacco products closely resembled the type of product traditionally regulated by the FDA.
Once the FDA decided it had legal authority over
tobacco, it set about determining how best to exercise
it. Despite the harm caused by tobacco, the agency
concluded that a total ban would not be effective in
preventing tobacco use and could even jeopardize the
public health by creating a black market for illegal
products. It then decided that it was not required to
choose between totally banning tobacco products and
taking no action. Rather, it concluded that it could
best protect the public health by focusing initially on
policies to reduce the number of children who start
to use tobacco. Therefore, it promulgated a narrowly
focused set of rules to accomplish that goal.8
The tobacco industry immediately challenged the
FDA. It claimed that the Congress that created the
agency and subsequent Congresses never intended it
to have authority over tobacco. To support this assertion, the industry noted that the FDA had been in
existence for decades and had never before concluded
that its authority extended to tobacco. Ironically, the
industry also claimed that Congress could never have
intended the FDA to have jurisdiction over tobacco
because tobacco products are inherently dangerous
and, thus, could never meet the agency’s basic safety
standards. The manufacturers actually claimed that if
it had the authority, the FDA would legally have to ban
tobacco products because they are so dangerous.15
On March 21, 2000, in a five-to-four decision, the
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Supreme Court agreed with the tobacco industry.16
I, like many others, believe that the Supreme Court’s
decision reflected a fundamental misunderstanding of
the factual basis for the FDA’s action. The Court acknowledged that tobacco products appeared to fit the
statutory definition of the terms “drug” and “drugdelivery device” in the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Nonetheless, the Court focused on the
years of inaction by the agency and the inconsistency
of allowing an agency charged with protecting the
public health to regulate a product that is inherently
dangerous.
I believe the Court got it wrong. For decades, the
tobacco industry hid the truth about what it knew
and what it was doing from the FDA, Congress, and
the people of the United States. The FDA’s prior inaction and its prior statements were the direct results
of the tobacco industry’s failure to disclose the truth.
What prompted the agency to act in 1996 was not
an expansion of its interpretation of the authority
granted to it by Congress, but the discovery of facts
that would have justified the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction decades earlier had the tobacco industry fully disclosed the truth. In essence, the Supreme Court’s
decision rewards the tobacco industry for its deceptive practices.
The Supreme Court’s conclusion that Congress
could not possibly have intended the FDA — an agency charged with protecting health and safety — to
have authority over a dangerous product is at odds
with the agency’s own interpretation of its ability to
protect the public health from products that are unsafe. The Court’s analysis could have ramifications for
more than tobacco, because it undermines long-standing precedent that a federal agency with expertise in
a particular area should be given deference in interpreting how it should best apply its authority. Once
the FDA decided it had legal authority over tobacco,
it correctly determined that it had the flexibility to
fashion a regulatory solution that would best protect
the public health under the circumstances that existed. If tobacco were introduced today, it would be
banned. However, given the millions of addicted users, the FDA’s decision that it could best reduce the
death toll from tobacco use by focusing first on policies to reduce the number of children who smoke represented thoughtful, disciplined public policy.
Nonetheless, whether right or wrong, the Supreme
Court’s decision places the onus of action squarely on
Congress. If the number of Americans who die from
tobacco use is to be reduced dramatically, a comprehensive approach that includes full authority over tobacco for the FDA is absolutely essential. There is no
substitute for effective government regulation; in the
case of tobacco products, such regulation would be
best carried out on a national level by an agency with
both scientific expertise and meaningful regulatory
authority.
1808 ·

The tobacco companies are in the business of making money. When they redesign products, they do so
to maximize profit, not to protect the public health.
If the two goals conflict, it is clear from our experience that these companies cannot be trusted to do
what is best for the health of the American public.
The importance of regulating tobacco products
cannot be overstated. Even if prevention and cessation efforts are given a high priority, millions of people are likely to continue to smoke. The only way to
be certain that products that are sold in the future
are truly less hazardous and are not marketed in a
way that encourages more people to smoke is by governmental oversight. The only way to control nicotine to promote the public health and not the tobacco
industry’s economic interest is through governmental oversight.
The need for regulation of tobacco has never been
greater. The tobacco companies have introduced a new
generation of products and have done so in a way that
leads consumers to believe the these products are substantially safer. R.J. Reynolds is making explicit healthrelated claims for its new product, Eclipse, including
purported reductions in cancer risk, carcinogenic compounds, respiratory tract inflammation, and secondhand smoke.17 Yet there is still no federal agency with
the authority to verify these claims. A study conducted this year by the State of Massachusetts found
that yields of tar, carbon monoxide, and nitrosamines
from Eclipse were much higher than those of several
other brands already on the market.18 The study also
found higher yields of nicotine, acrolein, and benzo[a]pyrene — all known carcinogens — in the smoke
from Eclipse than in smoke from several other brands.
These results demonstrate that tobacco companies
cannot be the sole source of scientific information
about their products.
There is also substantial evidence that the tobacco
companies are continuing the marketing practices that
have traditionally had such a powerful influence on
children. Despite claims that the companies have
changed, two studies19,20 found that tobacco advertising in youth-oriented magazines and tobacco marketing in retail outlets, such as convenience stores, had
increased, not decreased, in the year after the tobacco
companies settled their lawsuits with 46 states. The
states’ settlement with the tobacco companies in 1998
was supposed to bring about a fundamental change
in the marketing of tobacco products. That has not
happened.
Regulation of tobacco products by the FDA is not
a panacea, but it is an essential component of the effort to reduce the death toll from tobacco use. To be
effective, the FDA must be given formal authority over
tobacco products, similar to the authority it currently
has over drugs and drug-delivery devices. It must have
the power to compel the tobacco companies to make
public the full truth and to require changes in its prod-

Dec em b er 14 , 2 0 0 0
The New England Journal of Medicine
Downloaded from nejm.org at BOSTON UNIVERSITY on December 8, 2021. For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
Copyright © 2000 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.

SOUND ING BOA RD

ucts and marketing tactics in order to protect the public health.
The FDA has the personnel and the regulatory authority to regulate tobacco and is the only federal
agency with the breadth of scientific expertise and regulatory experience to carry out these tasks. In 2001,
Congress and the President should fill this gap by
providing the FDA with full authority over tobacco
products.
MATTHEW L. MYERS, J.D.
National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids
Washington, DC 20036
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